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Amsterdam School o f Economics
The twofold aim of this thesis is to understand Daniel Kahneman’s and 
Amos Tversky’s research, and to understand how this research has 
altered economics in fundamental ways. I frame my historical analysis 
in terms of Peter Galison’s disunity concept. Galison uses the notion of 
the disunity of science to capture the idea that sciences and scientific 
practices may be separate and different, but at the same time be 
communicating and mutually influencing each other.
I start by discussing the work of the mathematical psychologists and 
behavioral decision researchers at the University of Michigan in the 
1950s and 1960s. I argue that the key to understanding mathematical 
psychology and behavioral decision research is to see that, although 
largely separated and focused on different questions, both  presumed 
the same two-sided understanding of psychology. In order to measure, 
one needed a sound theory of the measurement instrument, which was 
the human decision maker.
This double understanding of psychology as using a measurement 
instrum ent to investigate that same measurement instrument became 
problematic when it turned out that the measurement instrument did 
not behave as it should. That was the problem Tversky struggled with. 
Tversky had to choose between declaring the experimental results 
invalid and saying that the received theory of the measurement 
instrum ent was incorrect.
Kahneman came to the rescue by suggesting that the human 
decision maker systematically and predictably deviates from how it 
should behave. Thus, the experimental results could be accepted, while 
at the same time the axioms of the measurement theory could be 
maintained. It did, however, give psychology the new task of 
investigating how and when human decision makers deviate from how
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they should behave. That new task was the basis of Kahneman and 
Tversky’s collaborative research of the 1970s.
Tversky was educated at and received his PhD in the early 1960s 
from the University of Michigan under the supervision of Clyde Coombs 
and Ward Edwards. Tversky’s research embodied the synthesis of 
mathematical psychology and behavioral decision research. Towards the 
late 1960s, however, Tversky increasingly struggled with the tension 
between Leonard Savage’s a priori axioms of decision theory and the 
behavioral deviations he observed in his experiments. Kahneman, for his 
part, came from a very different background. Strongly influenced by his 
experience as a psychologist in the Israeli army, Kahneman’s different 
research interests focused on hum ans’ cognitive mistakes. Kahneman 
showed that despite the fact that we think we do cognitively quite well 
in the course of our daily lives; in fact, we constantly make systematic 
cognitive mistakes.
In 1969 Kahneman and Tversky started their long and fruitful 
collaboration. I discuss Kahneman and Tversky’s research of the 1970s 
and show how in 1979 their research culminated in prospect theory, a 
theory which describes actual human decision behavior as a systematic 
deviation from the normative rules. Kahneman and Tversky considered 
prospect theory applicable to both economists’ and psychologists’ use 
of expected utility theory. The paper was published in Econometrica and 
argued that cognitive psychology and economics were unified in one 
field of behavioral science.
Subsequently, I investigate how economists responded to Kahneman 
and Tversky’s understanding of experimental violations of expected 
utility theory and their descriptive alternative, prospect theory. I argue 
that there were two main responses, each with their own history. 
Experimental economists such as Vernon Smith corroborated and 
accepted the experimental results, but rejected all preference theories as 
a solution, including expected utility theory and prospect theory. In 
addition, experimental economists inferred that the experimental 
deviations further emphasized the importance of the market as the 
mechanism that over time drives the economy to a rational equilibrium.
Financial economists, such as Richard Thaler, also accepted the 
experimental results, but instead they took it as proof of the observed 
irrationalities in financial markets. In addition, financial economists 
hailed Kahneman and Tversky and prospect theory as being the m ost 
important, if not the only claimant to a solution to the problem. The use
V o lu m e  2 , I s s u e  1, S u m m er 2009 162
H e u k e l o m  /  P hD  T h e sis  Su m m a r y
of prospect theory in financial economics led to the new field of 
behavioral finance. The reason for prospect theory’s swift success was 
that it offered financial economists an elegant way out of their 
problems. The normative-descriptive distinction ensured that traditional 
neoclassical models could be maintained as the normative theory, while 
at the same time it offered a descriptive alternative that was only 
slightly different from previously-used theories and hence easy to learn 
by economists.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Thaler also started applying the 
behavioral finance approach to problems outside the field of financial 
economics. The new field grew quickly and in 1994 it was officially 
termed behavioral economics. Once the traditional economic theories 
were saved in the normative realm and new theories could be developed 
under the rubric of descriptive theory, a surge of exploration ensued. 
Gradually the labels of normative and descriptive were replaced by full 
rationality and bounded rationality, which in turn allowed the behavioral 
economists to develop their own view of economic policy advice under 
the label of paternalism. These developments contributed to the gradual 
emergence of behavioral economics as a stable and clearly defined 
mainstream economic program. As a result, it also brought to the fore 
how behavioral economists saw their program as being different from 
other economic programs and disciplines. Behavioral economists began 
to distinguish their program, in particular from psychology and 
experimental economics.
The history discussed in this thesis shows how economists have 
actively used psychology to redefine economics. The flow of theories, 
methods, and experimental results from psychology to economics was 
not a neutral process that left these theories, methods and experimental 
results unaffected. Instead, they lost some of their psychological 
connotations and gained new economic connotations. What is 
particularly illustrative in this regard are the two cases of experimental 
and behavioral economics, which both added different new economic 
connotations to the theories, methods, and experimental results drawn 
from psychology to redefine economics in their own ways. Thus, as I 
argue in this final chapter, this thesis not only shows that the theories, 
methods, and experimental results that travelled from psychology to 
economic have not been stable entities, but it also shows that the 
definition of economics has not been constant. Therefore, the history of
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economics and psychology can only be understood by recognizing 
economics and psychology as disunified cultures.
Floris Heukelom obtained his PhD from the Amsterdam School of 
Economics in May 2009, under the supervision of John B. Davis 
(Amsterdam School of Economics) and Harro Maas (Amsterdam School 
of Economics). The author is currently assistant professor of economics 
at Radboud University Nijmegen, The Netherlands.
Contact e-mail: <F.Heukelom@fm.ru.nl>
V o lu m e  2 , I s s u e  1, S u m m er 2009 164
Copyright of Erasmus Journal for Philosophy & Economics is the property of Erasmus Journal for Philosophy 
& Economics and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the 
copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for 
individual use.
